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When to Regulate Hate Speech
John C. Knechtle*
Introduction
Laws that prohibit the expression of hate, commonly called hate
speech, against individuals or groups based on national or ethnic origin,
race, or religion are widely debated. Such laws proscribe a variety of
types of speech including racial, ethnic and religious epithets,' historical
revisionism about racial or religious groups (i.e. denying the Holocaust),2
or incitement to ethnic, racial or religious hatred, discrimination or
violence.3 Hate speech also arises in the context of a harassing and
hostile work or educational environment4 ; however this article addresses
the former three types of hate speech.
The extent of hate speech regulation in the world, including liberal
democracies, sharply contrasts with that of the United States, where free
speech interests prevail. Hate speech regulations impact much more than
the podium speaker on the street; they impact many areas of everyday
life, such as the Internet, freedom of the press, tort law, criminal law, and
reading materials, inter alia. Not only are hate speech regulations
affecting more areas of life, they are increasingly growing in favor
* Professor of Law, Director, International Programs, Florida Coastal School of
Law. I would like to thank David Douglas and Chris Roederer for their insightful
comments on an earlier draft of this article, and John Thomas, my research assistant.
1. See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Comparative Perspective:A Comparative
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2003); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:
A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133, 133-34 (1982).

2. See generally KENT GREENWAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS,
COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH (1995).
3. See ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1985); Mari Matsuda, Public Response
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2341 (1989);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1982).
4. See THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA,
AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995); Abigail C. Saguy,

Employment Discrimination or Sexual Violence? Defining Sexual Harassment in
American and French Law, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1091 (2000); see also infra note 208
and accompanying text.
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throughout the world. This contrast is especially clear in the area of
Internet hate speech, state laws and international conventions.
While the United States is becoming a hub for Internet hate speech, 5
other countries are prohibiting hateful content distributed on the Internet
in their countries. Internet hate speech is of particular interest because
the Internet is available in all countries and contains vast amounts of
information that is easily accessible. The United States Supreme Court
afforded the highest level of protection to Internet speech under the First
Amendment. 6 This is not the case in other countries. 7 In China, for
example, the government controls access to all communications through
the use of firewalls. 8 In a highly publicized French case, Yahoo, Inc. was
found liable for allowing French citizens access to sites which sold Nazi
memorabilia. 9 Germany, which has some of the strongest prohibitions of
Internet hate speech, will subject persons to criminal prosecution for
providing a hate speech site accessible to Germans.' ° Decisions by the
German courts have prompted Internet service providers (ISPs) to block
access to sites containing hate speech or symbols of hate speech.11 In
Canada, ISPs are protected from criminal prosecution for allowing access12
to hate speech. However, under the Canadian Human Rights Act,
individual web sites that communicate discriminatory material pertaining
to race, religion or national or ethnic origin are subject to injunctions
against the use of their sites. 13 This Act was enforced in 1997 when the

5. See Christopher D. Van Blarcum, Note, Internet Hate Speech: The European
Framework and the Emerging American Haven, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 781, 822
(2005); Peter J. Breckheimer II, Note, A Haven for Hate: The Foreign and Domestic
Implicationsfor ProtectingInternet Hate Speech Under the FirstAmendment, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1493, 1518 (2002).
6. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997); Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th
Cir. 2001).
7. Internet hate speech is the subject of considerable discussion. See, e.g., Van
Blarcum, supra note 5, at 781; Breckheimer, supra note 5, at 1518; Amy Oberdorfer
Nyberg, Note, Is All Speech Local? Balancing Conflicting Free Speech Principleson the
Internet, 92 GEO. L.J. 663, 663-64 (2004); Alexander Tsesis, ProhibitingIncitement on
the Internet 2002, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2002); Laura Leets, Responses to Internet Hate
Sites: Is Speech Too Free in Cyberspace? 6 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 287, 295 (2001).
8. Breckheimer, supra note 5, at 1509.
9. Joshua Spector, Hate Speech on the Internet, Spreading Angst or Promoting
Free Expression? Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 155, 173-76 (2002).
10. Van Blarcum, supra note 5, at 803.
11. Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison
of Regulations in the United States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253, 264
(2003); Breckheimer, supra note 5, at 1513.
12. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., Ch. H-6 (1985) (Can.).
13. Breckheimer, supra note 5, at 1516.
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4
Canadian government successfully removed an anti-Semitic web site.1
In addition to state sponsorship of Internet hate speech regulations, the
Council of Europe and the European Union are actively advocating civil
and penal liabilities for the distribution of hate speech via the Internet.15
Foreign governments are increasingly adding laws that prohibit
various forms of hate speech. Many hate speech regulations were in
response to the human rights violations during World War II. The
United Kingdom, for instance, enacted laws pursuant to its international
obligations that made the publication or utterance of words "which are
threatening, abusive or insulting" subject to criminal prosecution if that
expression were intended to incite hatred on the basis of race, national
origin or color. 16 The United Kingdom has added to this framework by
passing Section 5 of the Public Order Act 17 and the Protection from
Harassment Act 18. Germany has been particularly vigilant in passing
laws that prohibit hate speech. German law prohibits and criminalizes
incitement of hatred, or attacks on human dignity on account of race,
nationality, ethnic origin, or religion.' 9 In Australia, in New South
Wales, the Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act No. 48 of 1989 was the
first law that criminalized the incitement of hatred, serious contempt, or
severe ridicule of person(s) on the basis of race or membership in a
group by threatening harm or inciting others to threaten harm.2 ° Canada
has also passed legislation that provides for criminal sanctions for
advocacy of genocide and "inciting hatred against any identifiable group
where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace.,, 21 These
are only a few examples of the increasing number of countries enacting
hate speech regulations.

14. Citron v. Ziindel (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Jan. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/search/view-html.asp?doid=252&lg=_e&isruling-0.
15. Van Blarcum, supra note 5, at 789-802.
16. Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1546 (quoting Section Six of the Race Relations
Act).
17. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, 5-6 (Eng.).
18. Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, c. 40, 7 (Eng.).
19. Friedrich Kiibler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech? Transactional
Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 344-45 (1998).
20. Sharyn Ch'ang, Legislating Against Racism: Racial Vilification Laws in New
South Wales, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NONDISCRIMINATION 90 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992) [hereinafter STRIKING A BALANCE]

(quoting Section 20D).
21. John Manwaring, Legal Regulation of Hate Propagandain Canada, in STRIKING
A BALANCE, supra note 19, at 107-08 (quoting Section 319).
22. See, e.g., Gilbert J. Marcus, Racial Hostility: The South African Experience, in
STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 19, at 208; Stephen J. Roth, Laws Against Racial and
Religious Hatred in Latin America: Focus on Argentina and Uruguay, in STRIKING A
BALANCE, supra note 19, at 197; Eliezer Lederman and Mala Tabory, Criminalizationof
Racial Incitement in Israel, in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 19, at 182; Venkat
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Another example of international condemnation and prohibition of
hate speech are international conventions prohibiting such speech.
Among these conventions, the 1965 International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) provides for
the condemnation of all expression advocating the superiority of one race
or group over another group based on race, color or ethnic origin or
promoting racial hatred.2 3 CERD also requires criminalization and
injunction by states against persons who engage in those activities.24
Even the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Committee) took a
harsh stance against hate speech when it upheld a conviction of a French
literature professor who denied, among other things, the existence and
use of gas chambers against Jews during the Holocaust.2 5 The
Committee determined that under the United Nations Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights the Professor's statements would increase antiSemitism and interfere with the rights of the Jews to live free from the
fear of anti-Semitism. 26 Furthermore, the European Court of Human
Rights has consistently decided that hate speech regulations do not
violate freedom of expression.2 7 In Jersild v. Denmark,8 a racist youth
group made degrading remarks against immigrants. The European Court
agreed with the Danish court that the conviction of the youths was proper
because there were limitations on free speech when hate speech does not
provide for "the protection of the reputation or rights of others. 29
Internationally, the world is placing less emphasis on the freedom of
speech, and more emphasis on the dignity of persons.
The divide between the U.S. approach and the growing international
Eswaran, Advocacy of National,Racial and Religious Hatred: The Indian Experience, in
STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 19, at 171; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of
Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American and European Approaches, 1999, 7
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 309 (1999).
23. State Parties [must] condemn all propaganda and all organizations which
are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of
one color or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred
and discrimination in any form.... [State Parties] shall declare an offense
punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred, incitement to racial discrimination.., and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.... Shall declare
illegal and prohibit organizations .. . and all other propaganda activities, which
promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in
such organizations or activities as punishable by law. ...
Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1555 (quoting Art. 4).
24. Id. at 1555.
25. Report of the Human Rights Committee, Volume II, U.N. GAOR, 52 nd Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 (1999).
26. Id. at 96.
27. Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1555-56.
28. Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
29. Id. at 28.

2006]

WHEN TO REGULATE HATE SPEECH

consensus on hate speech is substantial. Those involved in this public
debate either support or oppose such laws despite the broad range of
histories with genocide, violence and discriminatory practices, values,
cultures, legal systems and jurisprudence, and despite the wide range of
harms hate speech laws seek to address. This article seeks to discover
the reasons for the differences, find common ground in the debate, and
propose a way for hate speech regulation to develop in the U.S.
The first section of this article identifies two umbrella harms that
regulations of hate speech seek to address: the harm of potential
violence and the harm to human dignity. This section also discusses the
rationale behind providing and prohibiting a legal remedy for such
harms.
The second section describes two critical factors for
consideration in deciding when and how a country chooses to regulate
hate speech: 1) a country's history with ethnic, racial and religious
violence, genocide, and discriminatory practices; and 2) its
jurisprudential history, which reflects the hierarchy of its constitutional
value choices. These factors are under-appreciated in the debate because
to give them their proper place would require understanding of not only
the legal arguments, but also a people's history and hierarchy of
constitutional values.
Finally this article posits that as each country decides how best to
balance its constitutional values, at a minimum, hate speech that
threatens unlawful harm or incites to violence may be proscribed. To
accomplish this in the U.S., this article proposes that in addition to
Brandenburg's"incitement to imminent violence test," the "true threats"
test should apply to hate speech. The true threats doctrine was initially
developed to protect the president, vice president and other high level
government officials from threats of violence and has since been
expanded to a broader application. It requires that the speaker intend his
or her language to be a threat (whether or not he or she actually intends
to carry out the threat), and that a reasonable listener, in context, would
interpret the language as a threat of unlawful harm. Intimidation can
constitute a true threat if it is to create a fear in its victims that they are a
target of violence. Such an approach addresses the more virulent forms
of hate speech, which, although not as extensive as hate speech
regulations adopted elsewhere in the world, constitute a starting point for
regulating hate speech.
I.

Forming a Basis of Hate Speech Codes

Although there are many arguments for why hate speech should be
regulated, many of these arguments fail because they do not take into
consideration the peculiarities of people from different countries, and the
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ideas upon which their governments were founded. Many commentators
have addressed the adverse impact of hate speech and have attempted to
invent mechanisms that they believe will adequately compensate for
those harms. However, the more pressing issue that theorists should
address is the practicability of the proposed theory and its potential
acceptability with legislators, judges, and the voting public. Many
commentators have suggested radical reforms, which are unlikely to gain
in popularity, except, perhaps, in the labyrinths of academia. On the
other hand, other commentators have so myopically focused on realworld utilitarian solutions for hate speech regulations that they propose
that the current system is adequate. 30 While it is true that the current
corpus juris works, the aspirational components of a better, more
peaceful society should not be forgotten or overlooked. This article
attempts to provide an alternative basis that will be closely tailored to the
history of a people, and the ideas associated therewith.
A reality based approach must first determine what harms are
created by hate speech. In practice, states have sought to protect their
citizens from violence and/or attacks against dignity. These harms are
recognized in state histories as harms that government has an interest in
protecting against pursuant to its police powers. Many hate speech
commentators have focused on why hate speech should or should not be
regulated. In an attempt to prove why such speech should or should not
be regulated, their postulates focus on the importance of the market place
of ideas,3 ' that feelings have a real emotive impact,32 or that judges
30. See Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress:
Lessonsfor Post-Brown Era, 46 VAND. L. REv. 865 (1993).
31. One commentator explains:
But it is not just the prevalence and strength of the idea of racism that makes
the unregulated marketplace of ideas an untenable paradigm for those
individuals who seek full and equal personhood for all. The real problem is
that the idea of the racial inferiority of non-whites infects, skews, and disables
the operation of the market (like a computer virus, sick cattle, or diseased
wheat). Racism is irrational and often unconscious. Our belief in the
inferiority of non-whites trumps good ideas that contend with it in the market,
often without our even knowing it. In addition, racism makes the words and
ideas of blacks and other despised minorities less saleable, regardless of their
intrinsic value, in the marketplace of ideas. It also decreases the total amount
of speech that enters the market by coercively silencing members of those
groups who are its targets.
Charles R. Lawrence III, FrontiersofLegal Thought II The New First Amendment: If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 432, 470
(1990) (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1859)).

See also Breckheimer,

supra note 5, at 1500; Dana Moon Dorsett, Note, Hate Speech Debate and Free
Expression, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 269-70 (1997); Calvin R. Massey, Hate
Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the FoundationalParadignms of Free Expression, 40
UCLA L. REv. 103, 167 (1992); Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful
Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 16 (1991); Robert C. Post, Free Speech and Religious,
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should place more emphasis on the idea of equality 33. These postulates
are "how to" arguments; in other words, they focus on "how to" prove a
libertarian or hate speech code advocate view. Although these postulates
add to the volumes of academic literature and philosophical debate, this
article emphasizes what harms states are willing and wanting to protect
against. Instead of focusing on "how to" arguments, the following
analysis will begin with what states, in practice, are protecting: harms
involving violence and harms against human dignity.

Racial, and Sexual Harassment:Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32
WM. AND MARY L. REV. 267, 274 (1991); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
32. One of the most prominent harms discussed by commentators is that racial
speech is inherently injurious to the individual to whom the racial speech is addressed.
Post, supra note 29, at 272; N. Douglas Wells, Whose Community? Whose RightsResponse to Professor Fiss, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 319, 321 (1995); Kim M. Watterson,
Note, The Power of Words: The Power of Advocacy Challenging the Power of Hate
Speech, 52 U. PITr. L. REV. 955, 969 (1991); Lawrence, supra note 31, at 462; J. Anglo
Corlett and Robert Francescotti, Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech, 48 WAYNE L.
REV. 1071, 1089 (2002). This harm is many times magnified when the racial expression
is directed at a group which has been historically discriminated against. Some have even
suggested that racist speech is a form of "spirit-murder." Patricia Williams, SpiritMurdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointingas the Law's Response to
Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 151 (1987). Victims of racist expression experience
feelings of self-hatred, inferiority, alienation, isolation, self-doubt, and helplessness.
Richard Delgado and David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An
Analysis of PaternalisticObjections to Hate Speech Regulations, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871,
887 (1994); Post, supra note 31, at 274. Proposals under this harm focus on the content
of the hate expression, its abusive nature, and the substantiality of the impact of the harm
upon the individual. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 179 (1982); Post,
supra note 31, at 274, n.38, n.39.
33. At least one commentator has characterized hate speech as a deontic harm due to
its affects on the individual's rights. Post, supra note 31, at 272 (citing George R.
Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 Miss. C.L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1988)).
Some have argued that toleration and protection for racist expression are inconsistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment's principle of equality. Post, supra note 31, at 272;
Wells, supra note 32, at 320; Massey, supra note 31, at 173-74. One commentator has
explained: "[A] society committed to ideals of social and political equality cannot remain
passive: it must issue unequivocal expressions of solidarity with vulnerable minority
groups and make positive statements affirming its commitment to those ideals. Laws
prohibiting racist speech must be regarded as important components of such expressions
and statements." Post, supra note 31, at 272. Another commentator suggests that many
civil libertarians and judges have ignored the special status of equality in the Constitution
and have focused exclusively on First Amendment values. James E. Fleming, Panel I:
The ConstitutionalEssentials of PoliticalLiberalism: Securing DeliberativeDemocracy,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1435-36 (2004). He suggests that the courts should balance
First Amendment rights with equal protection when the court must make a determination
as to the constitutionality of the allowance of hate speech and/or discriminatory action.
Id.
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Harm of Potential Violence

The harm of potential violence refers to the propensity of hate
speech to incite and cause violence.34 Society has a compelling interest
in limiting and eliminating violence due to its axiomatic harm, and the
more subtle harm created by engendering fear, suspicion, distrust, and
(1) protect
alienation. 35
The government's function is twofold:
individuals threatened with immediate violence, and (2) to "preserv[e]
the social conditions... that foster individual autonomy., 36 To maintain
societal harmony at a minimum, the government must ensure safety from
violence.37 One commentator observes:
In order for autonomous individuals to flourish [in a society] there
must exist certain social conditions conducive to autonomy. Freedom
and individual dignity can only survive in a community that
recognizes their value and is prepared to maintain them as principles
of the social order. But there are moments when the autonomous
individual takes actions that are inimical to the maintenance of the
social fabric which supports individual 38autonomy. One such moment
is when the individual incites violence.
To ignore or deny the relationship between hate speech and the
threat or incitement to violence is to not know history, including recent
history. One need not return to Nazi Germany in the 1930s and '40s to
understand the connection between hate speech and violence. Hate
speech was an integral component of the "ethnic cleansing" in the war in
Bosnia. In an effort to quell the fomenting violence, Bosnian police
dispersed peaceful demonstrations because of their hate speech content.
For example, at the urging of foreign democratic leaders, Bosnian Serb
police used tear gas and water cannons to disperse "hundreds" of
demonstrators chanting nationalist songs and anti-Muslim slogans in
Banja Luka on June 18, 2001. The demonstrators were attempting to
prevent the rebuilding of the 16th-century Ferhadija mosque, which
Bosnian Serb irregulars destroyed during the 1992-1995 war as part of a
campaign to remove all physical aspects of Bosnia's Muslim heritage.39
A U.S. State Department official asserted: "There are obvious freespeech concerns, but we need to put in place something to deal with the

34.

Massey, supra note 31, at 155.

35, Id.
36,
37.
Az. ST.
38.
39.

Id. at 156.
Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36
L. J. 953, 956-57 (2004).
Massey, supra note 31, at 156.
RFE/RLNewsline, Vol. 5, No. 115, Part II (June 18, 2001).
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abuses of the media-the hate, the racial epithets and ethnic slurs. 4 °
The media stoked the violence and even though proving a causal
relationship between racial or religious epithets in a particular newspaper
article or radio or television program and a specific act of violence may
be impossible, when understood in the context of the overall violence
engulfing the region, the state's interest in procuring peace supersedes
the right to express hate.
The 2004 movie Hotel Rwanda effectively portrayed the role that
hate speech broadcast over the radio played in the Rwandan genocide.
Between January and July of 1994, Radio-Television Libre des Mille
Collines (RTLM) in Kigali, Rwanda broadcast hate speech towards the
Tutsi minority encouraging the population on political grounds to
commit acts of violence against the Tutsi population.4' Initially the
French and U.S. governments opposed taking any action against RTLM,
with the U.S. Ambassador claiming that its euphemisms were subject to
many interpretations. 42 The Canadian ambassador later said: "The
question of Radio Mille Collines propaganda is a difficult one. There
were so many genuinely silly things being said on the station, so many
obvious lies, that it was hard to take it seriously ....
Nevertheless,
everyone listened to it-I was told [about it] by a Tutsis [sic]-in a spirit
of morbid fascination and because it had the best music selection." 4
RTLM's radio hate speech grew increasingly virulent with
devastating impact. On June 4, 1994 RTLM journalist Kantano
Habimana told listeners that "[tihey should all stand up so that we kill
the Inkotanyi and exterminate them ... the reason we will exterminate
them is that they belong to one ethnic group. Look at the person's height
and his physical appearance. Just look at his small nose and then break
it."' 44 These more virulent expressions of hate occurred during the peak
of the massacres.
Only after the Rwandan genocide had occurred did the international
community take RTLM's radio hate speech seriously. On December 3,
2003, after a three-year trial, the International Criminal Tribunal for

40.

Philip Shenon, Allies Create Press-ControlAgency in Bosnia, N. Y. TIMES, Apr.

24, 1998, at A8),
41. Radio Netherlands, Hate Radio: Rwanda, at http://www2.mw.nl/mwen/
features/media/dossiers/rwanda-h.html (last visited July 22, 2005). See also Jean Marie
Kamatali, Freedom of Expression and its Limitations: The Case of the Rwandan
Genocide, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (2002). The author is the former dean of the National
University of Rwanda.
42. Radio Netherlands, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze,
Judgement and Sentence (Summary) at 7, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, availableat http://www.ictr.org/default.htm.
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Rwanda (ICTR) sentenced one of the founders and Steering Committee
members of RTLM to thirty-five years in prison after it found him guilty
of five of the seven charges, including direct and public incitement to
commit genocide.45 In addition, the ICTR found a causal connection
between RTLM's broadcast of the names of Tutsi individuals and their
families and their murders.46
Order inheres in a successful society. If a government is unable to
protect its citizenry from violence, it will not be able to function. For
this reason, governments around the world have enacted hate speech
codes that address the harm of violence, or the potential for violence.4 7
In the United States, the Supreme Court has affirmed the power of
the government to protect itself from change procured by "violence,
revolution and terrorism. 4 8 In Brandenburgv. Ohio, the leader of a Ku
Klux Klan group was convicted under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism
statute for "advocat[ing] ...the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime,

sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform., 49 The defendant organized
a rally wherein twelve hooded Ku Klux Klan members privately united
to bum a cross and make derogatory racial epithets. 50 Additionally, the
defendant made threats against the government: "[I]f our President, our
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white,
Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance [sic] taken."'', The Court ruled that the government may
only prohibit the advocation of unlawful conduct if "such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." 52 The Court found that Ohio's statute was
unconstitutional as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
because it did not require imminent lawless action, nor did it distinguish
between mere advocacy and incitement.53 The Court found that certain
forms of advocacy could be prohibited only if predicated upon imminent
violence.54 Therefore, the United States has recognized that hate speech
may be prohibited, but set a very high standard for its prohibition.
The Netherlands prohibits hate speech that advocates violence.
Under section 137 of the Criminal Code, "Any person who, by means of
45. Id. at 28-31.
46. Id. at 16.
47. See text of Section II.A.
48. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).
49. 395 U.S. 444,444-45 (1969).
50. Id. at 445-46.
51. Id.at 446.
52. Id. at 447.
53. Id. at 448-49.
54. Id. at 447.
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the spoken or written word or pictorially, deliberately and publicly
incites.., violence against persons or property of others on account of
their race, religion or conviction or sexual preference, shall be
liable. . . .""
Likewise, France, in 1972, made "incitement to
discrimination, hatred or violence against a person or a group of persons
on grounds of origin or because of their belonging or not 'belonging
to a
6
given ethnic group, nation, race or religion ...an offence.
Even where violence is not explicitly mentioned, many states
prohibit insulting or racist speech. These states realize that there is a
cumulative affect of racial incitement, which, over time, will lead to
increased violence.
Israel has enacted laws to protect its citizens from violence. In
Israel, which has been plagued with racial unrest, the penal law provides:
"A person who publishes anything with the purpose of stirring up racism
is liable to imprisonment for five years. 5 7 This amendment to the penal
law was in response, in large part, to Rabbi Meir Kahane's election to the
Knesset.5 8 Kahane established a "political-racial movement," which
advocated the expulsion of Arabs from Israel and the reestablishment of
a theocracy. 59 After his election, Kahane openly called for the
persecution of Arabs in Israel to encourage their emigration. 60 He even
started to visit Arab communities to persuade the residents to leave Israel
and go to an Arab country.61 Understandably, Kahane's ideas were not
warmly received by Arab citizens and the police were forced to "quell
the resulting confrontations. 62 Israel's penal code seeks to prevent
violence that results from racist expression.
The implementation of hate speech codes to curtail violence is
necessary to facilitate an ordered, peaceful state. Few would argue that
the state does not have an interest in prohibiting speech that will lead to
violence. The real concern with the curtailment of violence as applied to
hate speech is one of degree. In the United States, a very high degree of
correlation between hate speech and violence is required before the
government may prohibit the speech: incitement to imminent violence.
Whereas, in other states, mere incitement is sufficient. However this
55. Ineke Boerefijn, Incitement to National, Racial, and Religious Hatred:
Legislation and Practice in the Netherlands, in STRIKING A BALANCE 202 (Sandra Coliver
ed., 1992).
56. Roger Errera, In Defence of Civility: Racial Incitement and Group Libel in
French Law, in STRIKING A BALANCE 147 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
57. Lederman, supra note 22, at 185.
58. Id. at 183.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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balance between civil liberties and government protection from violence
fluctuates based in part on how fearful the population is of potential
violence. Recent events in international terrorism appear to have swung
the pendulum in the U.S. in the direction of greater government
protection, even when it impinges on rights of free speech, freedom of
association and the right to privacy. In the wake of September 11, 2001,
supermajorities in both houses of Congress agreed to limit civil liberties
to achieve greater security by adopting the Patriot Act which among
other things, expanded the government's surveillance powers.6 3 In
addition to the surveillance allowed under the Patriot Act, President Bush
authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop within the U.S.
without a warrant. 64 Although the legality of some of these approaches is
debated, they show that when a majority of the population feels that its
safety is seriously threatened, people in the United States are willing to
make compromises between their rights and their safety. Time will show
us whether this current shift is a momentary reaction to the terrorist
attack of September 1 1 th, or a more permanent re-balancing.
It is also critical to realize that minority groups may have more
legitimate fears of violence being perpetrated upon them than the
majority does, particularly if there is a history of injuries being inflicted
by the dominant racial, religious or ethnic group. Minority groups may
therefore possess a keen interest in curtailing hate speech which
instigates this violence. However because of their minority status and
relationship with the majority, it may be difficult or even impossible for
them to persuade the majority of the importance of their concerns.
B. Harms Affecting Human Dignity
Human dignity has become a "fashionable concept" in modem
constitutions and conventions. This concept is hard to define because its
progeny was a dynamic process, and the concept is still in a state of flux.
Different states define human dignity differently. One commentator has
explained the basic nature of human dignity accordingly: "human
dignity is not merely a general philosophical concept or even an
63. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 50 U.S.C. § 401(a). The House approved the Act by a vote
of three hundred fifty-six for and sixty-six against, and the Senate vote was ninety-eight
for and one against. Michael Leon, Citizens Blast Patriot Act Madison Passes Civil
Liberties Resolution, Counter Punch, at http://www.counterpunch.org/leonl016.html
(last visited February 9, 2006).
64. Bob Deans, Bush Defends Eavesdropping Program, Preview State of Union
Speech, Cox News Service at http://www.coxwashington.com/reporters/content/reporters/
stories/BCBUSH27_COX.html (last visited February 9, 2006).
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individual attribute, but rather an expression of a sense of being that is
simultaneously personified and imbedded in the relationship between
Human dignity reflects a certain
individuals and their community. ..
must be treated simply due to
persons
all
which
standard of respect by
their intrinsic worth as human beings living in a community.
The right of human dignity may be exercised by the state or by
persons. For example, in Germany, a female stripper is not allowed to
voluntarily strip if she cannot engage her audience directly.66 The court
reasoned that regular strip shows engage the audience directly, thereby
participating in a form of self-expression similar to theatre or dance.67
Because the stripper was unable to engage the audience, her exposure
was simply degrading, which violated her right to dignity.6 8 The right to
human dignity is so important that the German government has an
independent duty to protect against abuse, even when the "abused" do
not want the government's protection.69
In South Africa, the concept of human dignity was foundational in
correcting the harms prevalent in the apartheid era. The Constitutional
Court has marked the vitality of human dignity: "the importance of
dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be
overemphasized... [t]his right therefore is the foundation of many of the
other rights ...,,70 The concept of human dignity was entrenched into
the Constitution to combat the extreme abuses of human dignity in the
apartheid era of South Africa.71 South African courts have since used the
Constitution to prevent many apartheid abuses, by, inter alia,
invalidating apartheid laws that allowed the police to use lethal force in
order to arrest someone.
Laws prohibiting sodomy were struck down due to concern that
sodomy laws create disdain by punishing a form of sexual expression
common to homosexuals, thereby degrading and devaluing the dignity of
homosexuals.72
65. Heinz Klug, Symposium Article: The Dignity Clause of the Montana
Constitution: May Foreign JurisprudenceLead the Way to an Expanded Interpretation?
64 MONT. L. REV. 133, 142 (2003) (explaining Peep Show Case (1), 64 BVerfGE 274
(1981) (F.R.G.)).
66. Id. at 143.
67. Idat 143.
68. Id. at 143.
69. Id. at 143-44.
70. Id. at 149 citing Justice O'Regan in S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 & 328
(CC). To see how South Africa has incorporated dignitary harms into antidiscrimination
law under the new South African Constitution, see Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable
Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and
South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1378 (2004).
71. Id. at 148.
72. Id. at 152-53.
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The concept of human dignity has played an important role in
Europe and South Africa in forming constitutional standards that the
government must enforce to ensure the rights of its citizens.
II.

A Factored Approach to Whether Hate Speech Codes Should Be
Implemented

Many speech code advocates argue that the United States should
borrow from hate speech laws in other countries; however, this approach
is flawed because it does not account for the peculiarities of people in
different countries. This "good for the goose, is good for the gander"
approach ignores the history and associated attitudes and assumes that all
peoples are homogeneous. Hate speech codes have typically focused on
radical approaches to regulation based on academics' views of what are
appropriate regulations in an ideal society without accounting for the
peculiarities of a people. This article proposes a positivist, factored
approach to determining whether hate speech code regulations should be
implemented and, if so, the degree of implementation on a state-by-state
basis.
There are two predominant factors that should be considered:
(1) historical accounts of ethnic, racial and religious violence, genocide,
and discriminatory practices; and (2) jurisprudential history. Hate speech
regulations are becoming increasingly prevalent in states that experience
or have experienced severe racial tensions and atrocities. These states
are implementing policies in order to facilitate a peaceful, harmonious
state by recognizing that hate speech codes may prevent hateful conduct.
Although the United States has been plagued with interracial tensions
and violence, and has performed genocidal atrocities, when it comes to
freedom of speech, it has placed a greater value on individual rights than
community rights, and a greater value on liberty than equality. This
libertarian bent almost always allows hate speech, unless there is an
imminent risk of violence. This threshold should be lowered to reflect
the reality of its pluralistic environment, coupled with its record on
human rights. However, one must also balance the jurisprudential
history of the United States in realizing workable solutions that have a
basis in United States legal tradition. Within that tradition, as well as in
other states, there is a strong interest in protecting citizens against
violence.
However, the concept of human dignity has not had the same impact
in the United States as it has in other countries. Because the concept's
development, as applied to political rights, was not incorporated into the
federal Constitution, it has not significantly developed in the common
law. In its place, the right of free expression has taken root.
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HistoricalAccounts of Ethnic, Racial and Religious Violence,
Genocide, and DiscriminatoryPractices

The first factor focuses on racial violence, genocide, and
discriminatory practices within the target state. Where these practices
are more prevalent and egregious, there is greater need to implement hate
speech code regulations. Like other governments, the United States has
a history of violence that needs to be regulated and controlled.
Germany is a strong supporter of hate speech codes. 73 It has a
peculiar history due to the atrocities the Nazis carried out against the
74
Jews during World War 1I.
Germany has enacted very broad hate
speech codes:
Whosoever, in a manner liable to disturb the public peace,
(a) incites hatred against parts of the population or invites
violence or arbitrary acts against them, or
(b) attacks the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously
degrading or defaming parts of the population shall be punished
by imprisonment of75 no less than three months and not
exceeding five years.
"Human dignity" is also broadly defined as an attack "on the core
area of [the victim's] personality, a denial of the victim's 'right to life as
an equal in the community,' or treatment of a victim as 'an inferior being
excluded from the protection of the constitution.' 76 The hate speech
codes prescribe significant punishments, including up to five years'
imprisonment or a fine.77

73. See Ranier Hofmann, Incitement to National and Racial Hatred: The Legal
Situation in Germany, in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 20, at 159.
74. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, CRIMES OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE LAW CONFRONTS HARD
CASES (University of Pennsylvania Press 2005); Douglas-Scott, supra note 21, at 319-20;
DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE FORMATION OF

HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY (Oxford University Press 2001).

75. Kilbler, supra note 19, at 344-45.
76. Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 322-23.
77. The German code includes the following punishment:
(2) Imprisonment, not exceeding five years, or fine will be the punishment for
whoever
(a) distributes,
(b) makes available to the public,
(c) makes available to persons of less than 18 years, or
(d) produces, stores or offers for use as mentioned in letters (a) to (c)
documents inciting hatred against part of the population or against groups
determined by nationality, race, religion, or ethnic origin, or inviting to
violent or arbitrary acts against these parts or groups, or attacking the
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There is a strong connection between Germany's history and its hate
speech codes. In a case against the leader of a right wing German
political party Bundesgerichtshof the defendant posted leaflets in a
public forum that declared that the murder of millions of Jews amounted
to "a Zionist swindle that could not be accepted."7 8
The
Bundesgerichtshof, the German Federal Supreme Court, upheld the
conviction by drawing a distinction between "mere falsification" and
"injurious invective," and found that the defendant was guilty of the
latter. 79 The Court found that the he had denied the Jews their
"inhuman" and "unique" fate. 80 The Court focused on the relationship
between the past instances of Third Reich genocide committed against
the Jews and the present views of the Jewish people, who identify
themselves as "belonging to a fatefully selected group," which is
tantamount to their "self-worth." Accordingly, denial of the Holocaust
denies the Jewish people of their personal value due to the "continuation
of discrimination against the group to which they belong." 8' This case
illustrates how Germany has disallowed hate speech because of the
historical instances of discrimination, hate and genocide, and the effect
82
thereof on the current Jewish citizens of Germany.
In Canada, which has a similar record of human rights abuses to the
human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously ridiculing or defaming
parts of the population or such a group, or
(e) distributes a message of the kind described in (1) by broadcast.
(3) Imprisonment, not exceeding five years or fine, will be the punishment for
whoever, in public or in an assembly, approves, denies or minimizes an act
described in section 220a paragraph 1 committed under the regime of Nationalsocialism, in a manner which is liable to disturb the public peace.
Kfibler, supra note 19, at 345.
78. Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 320, 324-25 (citing BGHZ 75, 160-61);
Hofmann, supra note 73, at 169.
79. Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 325 (citing BGHZ 75, 162).
80. Id.
81. The Court stated the Jews' fate:
[G]ives every one of them a claim to recognition and respect.... The single
fact that people were singled out under the so-called Nuremberg laws and were
robbed of their identity with a view to their extermination allocates to the Jews
living in the Federal Republic a special personal relationship with their fellow
citizens. In the context of this relationship the past is present even today. They
are entitled, as a matter of their personal identity, to be viewed as belonging to
a fatefully selected group, to which others owe a special moral responsibility
which is part of their self worth. Respect for their personal identity is for each
of them a guarantee against a return to such discrimination and a fundamental
condition for their living in Germany. Whenever someone tries to deny these
precedents, they deny each of these individuals their personal value. For this
signifies the continuation of discrimination against the group to which they
belong.
Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 325 (citing BGHZ 75, 162).

82.

Id.
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United States, the government has enacted hate speech codes to
counteract its past. 83 During the 1960s, Canada experienced increased
racial activities. 84 The Canadian government formed an investigative
committee to make recommendations concerning the troubling amount of
hate speech. 8 5 The committee recommended that new legislation be
passed because the existing laws were inadequate.86 Although its
recommendations were criticized by hate speech advocates, a newly
elected liberal government in 1970 passed new legislation that provides
criminal penalties for advocacy of genocide or the incitement of hatred
that is likely to lead to a breach of the peace.8 7 The supreme court of
of hate
Canada has upheld the law by reasoning that the suppression
88
propaganda is likely to reduce the harm to Canadian citizens.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Beauharnais v.
Illinois89 is an illustrative example of hate speech codes that correlate to
historical accounts of ethnic, and racial discriminatory practices. 90 In
Beauharnais,9 1 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an
Illinois statute that punished violators who engaged in hateful
expression.92 The Illinois statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to
manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or
exhibit in any public place in this state any lithograph, moving
picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition
83.

STEFAN BRAUN, DEMOCRACY OFF BALANCE: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND HATE

Toronto Press 2004); Manwaring, supra
note 20, at 107-08; James Weinstein, An American's View of the CanadianHate Speech
Decisions, in FREE EXPRESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 175-221 (W.J.
Waluchow ed., 1994); Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A RhetoricalAnalysis
of American and CanadianApproaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 1994 WIs. L.
REv. 1425.
84. Manwaring, supra note 21, at 107-08.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 109-16.
89. 343 U.S. 988 (1952).
90. However, the Court has suggested that Beauhamais would probably not stand
today. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J. dissenting from denial of
petition for writ of certiorari); 578 F. 2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (the "approach
sanctioned [in] Beauharnaiswould [not] pass constitutional muster today").
91. Although Beauharnaiswas never expressly overruled, scholars question whether
such a decision would be held up as constitutional. The concept of group libel as
unprotected expression in Beauharnais was not limited to false statements of facts.
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have clearly held that libel is of low 1t Amendment
value only insofar as it consists of false statements of fact. See GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PROPAGANDA LAW IN CANADA (University of

LouIs M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, THE

FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. Aspen, 2003).
92. 343 U.S. 250, 266-67 (1951).
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portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said
publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed
or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive

of breach of the peace or riots....93

The defendant was prosecuted for violating the Illinois statute because he
organized the distribution of leaflets on the streets of downtown Chicago.
The leaflets included a petition entreating the mayor and City Council of
Chicago "to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of
white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the
Negro... . ."94 The petitions called for "[o]ne million self respecting
white people in Chicago to unite [against] becoming mongrelized by the
negro [and against the] rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana of
95
the negro."
In framing the context of the Illinois statute, the United States
Supreme Court examined the history of racial prejudice in Illinois, and
the effect of "willful purveyors of falsehood., 96 The Court found that
Illinois was a polyglot community with "exacerbated tension between
races." 97 These tensions were illustrated by numerous riots and
bombings, desecration of personal property, and murder. The Illinois
legislature enacted the statute to counteract the effects of the culmination
of violence and ever-increasing diversity. 98 The Court granted the
Illinois legislature deference due to the abstruseness of the science of
government and its need to deal with "obstinate social issues" on a trial
and error basis. 99

The Court found that ruling against the Illinois

legislature would be an act of "arrant dogmatism" outside the scope of
the Court's authority. 10 0 The Illinois legislature was in a far better
position to assess the gravity of Illinois's history of racial hegemony in
relation to the deleterious effects on the dignity and "the position and
esteem in society [with which] the affiliated individual may be
inextricably involved."''1 Although the Illinois statute was subject to
discriminate enforcement, "the possibility of abuse is a poor reason for
denying Illinois the power to adopt measures against criminal
libels.
,,02 Accordingly, the Court found that libelous utterances are
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
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ergo, a
not within the confines of constitutionally protected expression;
103
showing of "clear and present danger" was unnecessary.
The Beauharnais Court properly considered Illinois' history in
determining whether the statute was constitutional, thereby giving great
deference to the legislature in formulating policies that would further
governmental interests in maintaining order. Although the Beauharnais
court focused on the constitutionality of libel law, the court's analytical
and historical approach to hate speech is useful because it realizes the
special needs of Illinois citizens, and grants deference to the legislature
to accommodate those needs. Hate speech advocates should also
implement the analytical approach applied in Beauharnais. The Court
focused on the substantiality of racial tensions, and deferred to the
judgment of the legislature in its intent to counteract those historical
tensions. In all of the above cases, the courts were concerned with the
peculiar history of the state in question. Those peculiar histories
included genocide, discrimination, and interracial violence.
The United States has a long history of committing human rights
atrocities, yet it has not embraced hate speech codes to the same extent as
its Western counterparts. In fact, courts in the United States seem
increasingly unwilling to impose restraints on the "freedom of speech,"
even though it has a troubled, highly emotional history of interracial
violence and suppression. 10 4 These abuses include, inter alia, the
genocide of Amerindians, 10 5 African American enslavement,10 6 Jim Crow
politics, 10 7 the internment of Japanese-Americans, 1° 8 human rights abuses
of Iraqi prisoners, 10 9 sterilization programs," 0 government abuses against
103. Id. at 266-67.
104. See Scott v. School Board of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003)
(upholding a school board ban on displays of the confederate flag based, in part, on the
importance of achieving a "civilized social order" in the classroom).
105. See generally William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts":
Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Pleafor Peace with Justice, 27
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002); WARD CHURCHILL, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERICAN LAW (2002).

106. See generally Patricia M. Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A
Forgotten Crime Against Humanity as Defined by InternationalLaw, 19 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 883 (2004); RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 216

(2000).
107. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL

EQUALITY (Oxford University Press 2004); JERROLD M. PACKARD,
NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW (St. Martin's Press 2002).

AMERICAN

108. See generally Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial,
51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 949-58 (2004); GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT:
FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS (Harvard University Press 2001);
ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION : LAW AND THE JAPANESE

AMERICAN INTERNMENT (Aspen Law & Business 2001).
109. See generally Charles H. Brower II, The Lives ofAnimals, the Lives of Prisoners,
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minorities,"1 ' the disproportionate killings of poor blacks in the prison
systems.1 12
Although these abuses may not be tantamount to the extermination
of 6 million Jews, the United States has not implemented sufficient
reforms to counteract the tensions brought about by its history of abuse.
These tensions were manifested during the Los Angeles riots, 1 3 are
prevalent on campuses and in schools, 1 4 and are felt on the street by
ordinary victims of hate speech' 15 . Despite these stresses and the
problems associated therewith, the United States has remained callous
towards the victims, and ignorant of its history, by failing to lower the
high threshold of imminent harm. The United States should lower the
threshold requirement to adequately reflect the current social problems
caused by its history of racial, ethnic, and religious abuses.
B. JurisprudentialHistory
The second factor that must be analyzed in order to assess the

and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353 (2004); THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel,
Cambridge University Press 2005).
110. See generally PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF
INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).

111.

See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON

L. REV. 77 (1994); Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself. Identity, Politics, and Law, 75
OR. L. REV. 647, 679 (1996); MICHAEL D'ORSO, LIKE JUDGMENT DAY: THE RUIN AND
REDEMPTION OF A TOwN CALLED RoSEWOOD 323 (1996); Rhonda V. Magee, The

Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations
Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 882-99
(1993).

112. See Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparitiesin the
War on Drugs (Section III. Incarceration and Race), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/Rcedrg00-01 .htm (last visited July 22, 2005).
113. Smith, supra note 109, at 77; Lou CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE: How
RODNEY KING AND THE RIOTS CHANGED Los ANGELES AND THE LAPD (Westview Press
1997).

114. See generally Adam A. Milani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools: The
Validity of Schools' Regulations of Fighting Words and the Consequences If They Do
Not, 28 AKRON L. REV. 187 (1995); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
ConstitutionalNarratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); HATE SPEECH ON
CAMPUS: CASES, CASE STUDIES, AND COMMENTARY (Milton Heumann, Thomas W.
Church, and David P. Redlawsk. eds., Northeastern University Press 1997); RICHARD
DELGADO AND JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY,
AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (New York University Press 1997); TIMOTHY C.
SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL (University Press of Kansas 1998).
115. See generally EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLORBLIND RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

(Rowman & Littlefield 2003); Christopher A. Bracey, Symposium: Race Jurisprudence
and the Supreme Court: Where Do We Go From Here? Dignity in Race Jurisprudence,7
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 703-04 (2005).
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viability of hate speech codes and the extent of the regulations pertaining
thereto is the jurisprudential history of the state. This would include:
case law, statutes, constitutions, legislative debate, and ideas and
comments from the founders of the state. Jurisprudential history is a
vital component because it solidifies the basis by which a state should be
governed. Once these state laws and principles are declared and
developed, people rely on them in the act of expression, and in response
to a perceived violation of those rights. These ideas are also reinforced
by the judiciary, which interprets legislative action in accordance with
constitutional principles and jurisprudence.
Hate speech codes, although enacted, may fail to take effect if the
people protest and demonstrate against perceived wrongs by the
executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.
Alternatively, a judicial officer may declare unconstitutional those hate
speech codes, or limit their application so severely as to defeat their
purpose."l 6 These examples, among others, illustrate that hate speech
codes that are too broad or expansive will have no realistic chance of
survival due to revolt or vote by the public at large or by limiting
interpretations by the judiciary. Although over-expansive hate speech
codes are interesting to talk about in the spirit of academic intercourse,
hate speech codes should be drafted in such a way as to pass
constitutional muster, and reflect constitutional principles with which the
people can identify.
European conceptions of human dignity are incongruent with the
United States Constitution because human dignity has not developed as a
constitutional right, and there is a strong emphasis on the First
Amendment-limited only by violent acts. Expansive hate speech codes
in Europe have enjoyed more support because its jurisprudential history
is radically different from that of the United States. In Europe, hate
speech is liberally prohibited based on the concept of human dignity.
Accordingly, freedom of expression does not have as many protections.
However, the United States' approach has centered on the harms of
violence. The United States Constitution does not mention the concept
of human dignity; instead, its history emphasizes free speech.
1. The Use of Human Dignity in Conventions and Constitutions
in Europe
Although the concept of human dignity is not new in Western17
history, it is not an explicit concept in United States jurisprudence.
116. Kilbler, supra note 19, at 337-38.
117. The sole exception is Montana, which makes reference to human dignity but has
not developed a jurisprudence on the subject. Klug, supra note 65, at 133.
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Additionally, although the theological underpinnings of human dignity
have evolved over centuries and are now extensive, 1 8 the humanistic
progeny of dignity started in the Renaissance and is largely attributed to
Fra ncesco Petrarca." 9 His writings inspired other Renaissance writers,
including Bartolomeo Facio, Giannozzo Manetti, and Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola. 120 These Renaissance thinkers considered dignity 12a1
creation of God; however, their ideas reflected a personal autonomy.
Over time, this concept deemphasized man as a creature subjected to
God, and emphasized autonomy in an inter-personal society. 2 2 John
Locke posited that a person's rational capacities are the foundations of
his individuality.123 Samuel von Pufendorf further developed this idea by
describing man's dignity as embodying a privileged position in this
world and humankind's rational nature as engendering equality. 2 4
Immanuel Kant added to this framework by defining dignity "as a quality
of intrinsic, absolute value, above any price, and thus excluding any
equivalence."' 2 5 The concept of human dignity as it applied to political
rights was embellished by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who theorized that
justice can be accomplished through man's ability to reason, and that
justice is "the respect of human dignity in [a] person."'' 26 These political
embellishments were embraced by Ferdinand Lasalle in his attempt to
describe the conditions of the working class as a deprivation of
dignity. 127 On that same theme, Peter Kropotkin considered human
dignity the basis for morality and justice. 28 The concept of dignity,
especially in recent years, has been the subject
of much political debate
129
and academic review in Europe and abroad.
118. See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER ON THE VALUE AND INVIOLABILITY OF
HUMAN LIFE: EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995); HENRI J. M. NOUWEN, LIFE OF THE BELOVED,
SPIRITUAL LIVING IN A SECULAR WORLD, 10TH ED. (CROSSROAD, 2002); THOMAS MERTON,
No MAN IS AN ISLAND (DELL,1955); ROLLO MAY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF (NORTON,
1953); JEAN VANIER, BECOMING HUMAN (ANANSI, 1998); JEAN VANIER, THE HEART OF
L'ARCHE (CROSSROAD, 1995).
119. Izhak Englard, URI and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture: Human Dignity,
From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
1903, 1910 (2000). See also CHARLES TRINKAUS, THE POET AS PHILOSOPHER: PETRARCH
AND THE FORMATION OF RENAISSANCE CONSCIOUSNESS, 124 (Yale University Press 1979).

120.
121.
123.

Englard, supra note 119, at 1912-14.
Id. at 1912.
Id. at 1914. See also NATHAN ROTENSTREICH, MAN AND HIS DIGNITY 53 (1983).
Englard, supra note 119, at 1917.

124.

Id.

122.

See also SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE lURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk.

II, ch. 1, § 5 (C.H. & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1995) (1706).
125. Englard, supra note 119, at 1918.
126. Id. at 1920 n.84.
127. Id. at 1920-21.
128. Id. at 1920 n.85.
129. Judith Resnik and Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the
Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2000).
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The ideal of human dignity was memorialized, and embellished, in
conventions after World War II in Europe. 130 For example, Kant's idea
of dignity's "absolute and intrinsic character" influenced the: Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine; and Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights. '31
Increasingly, newly adopted constitutions relied heavily on the
concepts of human dignity. 32 Human dignity, "stripped of both religious
connotation and strict Kantian moral meaning," is popularized in
constitutions as being the "ultimate justification" for fundamental human
rights. 33 This trend is illustrated in the German, Puerto Rican, and South
34
African constitutions.
In Germany, the first article of the Basic Law boldly declares that
"Human Dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all
state authority. 135 The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable
and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace
and of justice in the world."'136 In Germany, which hosts some of the
most expansive hate speech codes; the jurisprudential history was largely
predicated upon equal rights due to the treatment of the Jews during the
Holocaust. 137 Prior to 1945, German courts refused to punish or bar antiSemitic propaganda. 38 Once the Nazis were defeated by the Allies,
those jurisprudential precedents were overturned. 139 A German postWorld War II court explained that the Nazi persecution of Jews provided
Jews with a new distinguishing identity that should be owed a certain

130. Englard, supra note 119, at 1921.
131. Id. at 1921 n.88. Bracey, supra note 115, at 678. Luis Anibal Aviles Pagan,
Human Dignity, Privacy and PersonalityRights in the ConstitutionalJurisprudence of
Germany, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
343, 346 (1998) (stating "[i]n Germany, the ideas of Kantian moral theory are deeply
ingrained in the legal structure"); see also Edward J.Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy,
and Personality in German and American ConstitutionalLaw, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963,
975-76 (1997).
132. Pagan, supra note 131, at 351.
133. Englard, supra note 119 at 1923.
134. Other states have similar constitutional provisions for human dignity, such as:
Brazil, Costa Rica, Nicaragua.
See Christopher A. Bracey, Symposium: Race
Jurisprudence and the Supreme Court: Where Do We Go From Here? Dignity in Race
Jurisprudence,7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 683 (2005).
135. Art. 1, Sec. 1, The German Basic Law of 1949.
136. Art. 1, Sec. 2, The German Basic Law of 1949.
137. Kilbler, supra note 19, at 342; Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 319.
138. Id. at 341.
139. Id.
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degree of respect and dignity. 40 The court reasoned that esteem and
respect was an indispensable condition to continued living in Germany,
and a guarantee that anti-Semitic genocide and discrimination would be
protected against. 141
Thus, German courts increasingly became
paternalistic in their endeavor
to ensure adequate protection of those
42
post-Holocaust values.
Under this framework of German jurisprudential history, hate
speech codes have been effectively proposed and implemented into the
German corpus juris. The German legislature has clearly defined its
values and aspiration for the state vis-A-vis the constitution, which values
have been perpetuated by the German judiciary. Under these auspices, it
is little wonder that hate speech codes have enjoyed such acceptance in
Germany.
The Puerto Rican Constitution uses human dignity as a fundamental
source of rights, and as an interpretive tool. The Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico declares:
[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable. All men are equal
before the law. No discrimination shall be made on account of race,
color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious
ideas. Both the laws and the system of public 43
education shall
embody these principles of essential human equality. 1
The Puerto Rican courts have emphasized the fundamental importance of
human dignity to the constitution, and the interpretation of rights.' a It
reflects a balance between the United States Constitution and an
expansion of rights under emerging international human rights norms
during the 1940s "to gather... [from] different cultures... new
categories of rights.' 4 5
Likewise, in South Africa, in response to the de-humanization of
apartheid, the concept of human dignity was memorialized in the
Constitution and serves as an interpretative tool to other rights
140. Id.at 342.
141. Id.at 341.
142. Id.; Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 327.
143. Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and
TransnationalConstitutionalDiscourse, 65 MONT. L. REv. 15, 22-25 (2004).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 22 (citing Estado Libre Asociado v. Hermandadde Empleados, 104 P.R.
Dec 436, 439-40 (1975)). The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has stated that:
"Formulation of a Bill of Rights following a broader style than the traditional,
that would gather the common feeling of different cultures on new categories of
rights[,] was sought. Hence the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties exercised such an
important influence in the drafting of our Bill of Rights."
Estado Libre Asociado v. Hermandadde Empleados, 104 P.R. Dec. 436, 439-40 (1975)).
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146
guaranteed in the Constitution.
Even in some Western nations that do not have express
constitutional provisions, human dignity is of constitutional importance.
The Canadian Supreme Court has held that the rights and freedoms in the
Canadian charter "are inextricably tied to the concept of human
dignity." 147 Likewise, Israel enacted the Basic Law of Human
Dignity,
48
which gives constitutional importance to dignity concerns. 1

2.

Human Dignity in U.S. Jurisprudence

The United States Constitution does not mention human dignity.
Although Kant lived during the genesis of the United States Constitution,
his most influential writings on human dignity were not published until
1785. Theological and natural law underpinnings of human dignity
seeped into the Declaration of Independence and Gettysburg Address in
the words, "all men are created equal,"' 149 which implies that before the
Creator and in the eyes of the country's founders as least as understood
by Abraham Lincoln, each person is intrinsically equal, apart from any
ability or inability, appearance, or argument. If each individual and
group of persons possess intrinsic equality and human dignity, then "no
state interest can justify practices that both reflect and reinforce cultural
assumptions about the intrinsic superiority of whites over blacks, men
over women, "legitimate" over "illegitimate" children, or heterosexuals
over homosexuals."' 50 Equality based on a common trait disappears
when that trait is no longer shared. However, equality flowing from
human dignity because we are all created equal is all-encompassing and
never disappears. Because this language did not make it into the more
secularized language of the Constitution, to develop this concept would
require the Supreme Court to at least use it as an interpretative tool
regarding the Equal Protection Clause.
In any case, recognizing that the idea of human dignity gives rise to
rights under a constitution was a dynamic process, which was not
popularized until after the World Wars.' 51 In other words, the drafters of
the United States Constitution were not concerned with the developed
Kantian view of human dignity prevalent in many parts of the world and
they did not include the natural law language of the Declaration of
146.

Klug, supra note 65, at 153.

147.
148.

See R. v. Morgentaler [1998] S.C.R. 30, 164 (Can.).
See Bracey, supra note 115, at 683.

149.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para II (U.S. 1776).

THE GETTYSBURG

para. I (U.S. 1863).
150. George P. Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under
Law, 99 COLUMB. L. REv. 1608, at 1624 (1999).
151. SeeBracey, supranote 115, at681.
ADDRESS,
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Independence. Due to this absence in the federal Constitution, human
dignity has been "relegated to [the] background of extra-constitutional
principles."' 152 Although it has some proponents, such as Justice
Brennan153 and Justice Stevens, 154 it has not been used to interpret or
of Puerto Rico,
guaranty rights as do, for example, the constitutions
155
Germany, and South Africa with dispositive affect.
3. Restrictions on Free Speech in the United States are Generally
Based on Fear of Violence, or Endangerment of the Federal Government
The jurisprudential history of the United States has focused on a
more libertarian approach to freedom of speech. The United States has
been reluctant to interfere with free speech unless the speech will lead to
violence, or directly endanger the foundations of government.
Despite the absolutist language of the First Amendment that
"Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press,"' 156 the Supreme Court has never in its history advocated an
absolutist theory of free speech. 157 Free speech, like all rights and
freedoms, will at times conflict with other rights and freedoms. In
balancing competing rights and freedoms the Supreme Court has held
158
that free speech does not prevail when it comes to obscenity,
defamation, 159 national security, 160 fighting words, 161 incitement to
152. Pagan, supra note 131, at 360. But also see Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth
Amendment, Human Dignity and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, 151 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent
eds., Cornell 1992) (discussing Chief Justice Earl Warren and human dignity).
153. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address, Construingthe Constitution, 19 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 2, 8 (1985); Bracey, supra note 115, at 683.
154. "Justice Stevens ...regularly draws inspiration from the religious foundation of
equal protection and quotes the principle that all persons are created equal." George P.
Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 COLUMB.
L. REv. 1608, at 1628. See also footnotes 50 and 71.
155. Pagan, supra note 131; Jackson, supra note 143. But also see Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
157. Justice Black maintained that laws limiting speech were unjustified "by a
congressional or judicial balancing process." Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
141 (Black, J., dissenting). His view was never shared by a majority of the court. See
Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 389, 393
(2004).
158. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
159. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
160. See New York Times Co. v. United States; United States v. Washington Post
Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), the court upheld
Agee's passport revocation because his statements and activities abroad caused "serious
damage to the national security." The court stated,
[L]ong ago, [this] Court recognized that "No one would question but that a
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163
extortion, 164
imminent violence, 62 the counseling of murder,
blackmail,' 65 perjury, and true threats. 6 In addition, the Court has found

some speech more regulable than others, such as commercial speech and
public employee speech, 67 and allowed government to place content
neutral time, place and manner restrictions on speech.
In Whitney v. California, decided in 1927, the Court placed
limitations on the freedom of speech when the foundations of
government were at risk. 168 Defendant Whitney was a member of the
Communist Labor Party of California, which advocated the creation of a
"unified revolutionary working class" to conquer and overthrow the
capitalist United States. 169 Defendant was convicted under California's
Criminal Syndicalism Act.' 70 The Court addressed whether defendant's
constitutional rights to the freedom of speech were violated, but found
"[t]hat the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does
not confer.., an unbridled license [to] those who abuse [the freedom of
speech] by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to
crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized
government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means., 17 1 Thus, the

Court found that there were certain limitations to the freedom of speech.
In Dennis v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principle that Congress may enact laws protecting the
United States government. 72 The defendant conspired to organize the
Communist Party. 173 The Supreme Court reasoned that the government
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of
troops."
Agee's disclosures [have] the declared purpose of obstructing
intelligence operations and the recruiting of personnel. They are clearly not
protected by the Constitution.
Id.
161. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
162. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
163. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (prohibiting counseling to
murder is constitutionally permissible).
164. See 18 U.S.C. 1951 (2000) (prohibiting conspiracy to commit extortion under the
Hobbs Act).
165. See 18 U.S.C. 873 (2000) (outlawing blackmail).
166. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941).
167. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (limiting public employee speech is
constitutional).
168. 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
169. Id. at 363-64.
170. Id. at 363. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11402 (1953).
171. Id. at 371.
172. 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951).
173. Id. at 497.
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has a substantial interest in limiting speech where there is a "clear and
present danger." 174 The Court interpreted this phrase to mean that "[i]n
each case involving the 'clear and present danger' test, courts must ask
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."'' 75 The
Court concluded that
defendant's communist expression subjected him to
176
criminal liability.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court determined that hate
speech may only be prohibited when the content of the expression is
likely to incite imminent harm. 177 The leader of a Ku Klux Klan group
was convicted under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute1 78 for
"advocat[ing]... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing
industrial or political reform.', 179 Defendant Brandenburg organized a
rally wherein twelve hooded Ku Klux Klan members privately united to
bum a cross, and make derogatory racial epithets, including, inter alia:
180
"bury the niggers," "this is what we are going to do to the niggers.'
Additionally, Brandenburg made threats against the government: "if our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken."' 8' The Court declined to follow Whitney, ruling that
Whitney had been "thoroughly discredited" and that the State may only
prohibit advocating of unlawful conduct if advocacy "is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."' 8 2 The Court found that Ohio's statute was
unconstitutional as a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
because it did not require imminent lawless
action, nor did it distinguish
183
between mere advocacy and incitement.
In Beauharnais v. Illinois,'84 discussed above, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that punished those who
engaged in hateful expression. 85 The Court examined the history of
174. Id. at 504.
175. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
176. Id. at 542.
177. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
178. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (1972).
179. Id. at 444-45.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 446.
182. Id. at 447.
183. Id. at 448-49.
184. 343 U.S. 250 (1951). Although Beauharnais was never expressly overruled,
scholars question whether such a decision would be upheld as constitutional. See supra
notes 92 and 93, with accompanying notes.
185. Id.at251.
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was
racial violence in Illinois and determined that the Illinois legislature
86
1
community.
polyglot
the
of
needs
the
assess
to
in the best position
In Chaplinski v. New Hampshire,the Court upheld a statute because
it found that the statute was not a prohibition of the speaker's words
"except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the
persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed."' 8 7 The Court
upheld the conviction because certain classes of speech were unprotected
by the Constitution, such as fighting words. 188 Fighting words are those
words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace."' 189 The Court reasoned that the utterance
must be "likely to cause a fight."' 190 Thus, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute based on the propensity of the speaker's
words to incite violence. 191
These cases are illustrative of the jurisprudential tendency to uphold
convictions and statutes that are predicated upon the right of the state to
protect its citizens from harm exclusively caused by violence, or violent
revolution. Overall, courts have typically enforced limitations on the
freedom of speech in the United States where the statutes are an exercise
of state police power to protect the citizenry from physical harm.
In order for hate speech codes in the United States to pass
constitutional muster, based upon the jurisprudential history outlined
above, they must predicate themselves upon elimination or reduction of
physical harm. The courts do not, however, appear to be concerned with
the European concept of human dignity.
4.
The Approach to Freedom of Expression in Countries that
Emphasize Human Dignity in Their Constitutions
Freedom of expression as understood in the United States does not
address the harms of speech to the same extent as in states whose
constitutions embrace the concept of human dignity. Because the
German legislature has imposed considerable restraints on the freedom
of expression, hate speech codes that interfere with that right have
received more support. 192 Much like the guarantee of free speech in the
United States Constitution, the German Basic Law also guaranties
freedom of expression. Freedom of speech is protected accordingly:
"Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 259.
315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 321.
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opinion by speech, writing, and pictures and freely inform himself from
generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of
reporting by means of broadcasting and films are guaranteed. There
shall be no censorship."'1 93 However, a delineation is affixed: "These
rights are limited by the provision of the general laws, the provisions of
law for the protection of youth, and right of inviolability of personal
dignity."1 94 The German Basic Law is premised on the inviolable
"dignity of man" and "[t]o respect and protect it shall be the duty of all
state authority."' 195 Article 1 of the German Constitution serves as an
interpretative96 guide to the judiciary of the entire German legal
experience.'

In line with the German Basic Law, German courts have
consistently denied freedom of expression where it might conflict with
human dignity. 197 In Straubeta Caricature,a magazine published a set of
harsh cartoons of a political figure dressed as a pig engaging in various
forms of sexual activity.' 98 The court reasoned that the cartoon deprived
99
the political figure of human dignity.'
Human dignity has even played a significant role in the
development of defamation law in South Africa.200 In Khumalo v.
Holomisa,20 1 the plaintiff, a public official, brought a defamation suit
against a publisher based on an alleged violation of his dignity. The
publisher argued that the rule in New York Times v. Sullivan20 2 should be
adopted, which requires a showing of actual malice.20 3 The court
reasoned that free speech must be "construed in the context of other
values enshrined... [in] the values of human dignity, freedom, and
equality.,

20 4

The court rejected the publisher's arguments because the

"value of human dignity ... values both the personal sense of self worth
as well as the public's estimation of the worth or value of an

193.

Id. (quoting Art. 5.2 GG).

194.

Id.; Ronald J. Krotosznski, Jr., A

Comparative Perspective on the First

Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a
PreferredConstitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2004).
195. Pagan, supra note 131, at 346.
196. Douglas-Scott, supra note 22, at 322.
197. In addition to criminal sanctions, some written forms of expression are strictly
forbidden, such as Mein Kampf Krotosznski, supra note 194, at 1597.
198. Id. at 1575-77.
199. Id. at 1576. But see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
200. Klug, supra note 65, at 153.
201. Khumalo v. Holomisa, 2002 (5) SA 401, & 40 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771, & 40
(CC), 2002 (53) SALR 01, & 40 (CC).
202. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
203. Klug, supra note 65, at 153.
204. Id. at 153-54.
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individual.

2 °5

Justice O'Regan, writing for the court, stated,

The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot.., be
doubted. The Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in
which human dignity for black South Africans was routinely and
cruelly denied. It asserts it too inform the future, to invest in our
democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings.
constitutional adjudication and
Human dignity therefore informs
20 6
interpretation at a range of levels.

The court balanced both freedom of expression and human dignity
in fashioning a rule which allowed a suit by an allegedly defamed
plaintiff, but a defense of reasonable publication by the publisher.20 7
III.

Hate Speech Regulation: Building on Common Ground

Hate speech that threatens unlawful harm or incites violence should
be proscribed in all countries. This is merely the baseline because of the
fundamental obligation of government to protect its citizens. Based on
the two factors discussed above, a country's history of ethnic, racial, and
religious violence, genocide and discriminatory practices and a country's
jurisprudential history, a country may restrict additional forms of hate
speech consistent with the principle of freedom of expression. At a
minimum, however, it has the constitutional authority to restrict speech
that leads to violence or the threat of violence.
This common ground for hate speech regulation to prevent violence
and fear of violence is rooted in both historical experience and common
constitutional values. Because all genocides have been motivated by
hatred rooted in racial, religious, ethnic, or national origin differences,
laws regulating hate speech naturally focus on those areas. In some
instances they include gender and sexual orientation. Of course, most
violence is inflicted apart from genocide, but often the motivating factors
are the same and these factors are what often conflagrate the violence.
This approach is, for the most part, already embraced outside the U.S., so
we now look at how the U.S. can implement this approach.
To implement this article's proposal, hate speech laws in the U.S.
should be written to cover hate speech that incites to imminent violence
or contains a true threat. Hate speech may currently be regulated in the

205. Id. at 154.
206. Christopher J. Roederer, Post-matrix Legal Reasoning: Horizontality and the
Rule of Values in South African Law, 19(3) S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 57 (2003) at 66-67,
quoting Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000(3) SA 936 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 837
(CC) para 35.
207. Khumalo, supra note 201 at 44.
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U.S. if it fits under the Brandenburg v. Ohio20 8 test: "the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action. '' 20 9 Thus, hate
speech purveyors must advocate imminent illegal conduct, intend to
incite such conduct, and be likely to produce such action.
The imminence requirement of this test makes it difficult to meet in
most cases, and if law enforcement waits until the violence begins, of
what use is this standard in preventing violence? In recent years
Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice (Department) have become
concerned about the increased availability of bomb-making instructions
on the Internet, probably a legitimate concern in our world of increased
terrorist activity. In a 1997 report to Congress the Department argued
that Brandenburg should not apply to the publication of such
information, stating that when it is foreseeable that such speech will be
used for criminal purposes, "imminent should be of little, if any,
relevance., 210 In Rice v. Paladin,2 1'which involved civil liability of
publishers of murder manuals, the Fourth Circuit, recognizing the danger
of such speech, held that Brandenburg only applied to "the mere abstract
teaching... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for resort to
lawlessness" and not to technical teachings on the fundamentals of
murder.21 2
In NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co., seventeen white merchants
sued the NAACP and Mississippi Action for Progress and 146
individuals over a boycott of their stores.21 3 At issue was Charles Evers,'
the Field Secretary of the NAACP in Mississippi, words to a crowd of
African-Americans: "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist
stores, we're gonna break your damn neck., 2 14 The Court found that
because the violence that took place occurred weeks or months after the
208. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
209. Id. at 447.
210. Department of Justice, 1997 Report on the Availability of Bombmaking
Information 26 (1997) Feb. 10, 2000, at 24, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminaI/cybercrime/
bombmakinginfo.html.(last visited February 1, 2006).
For an excellent discussion of how the Brandenburg test does not achieve the
appropriate balance when speech advocating lawless behavior does not cause any
imminent danger but still poses a grave risk, see S. Elizabeth Wilbom Malloy & Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond
Brandenburg,41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2000).
211. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 841 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, 128 F.
3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
212. Idat263.
213. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
214. Id. at 902.
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speech, defendants could not be held liable.21 5 The rationale for the
requirement that the violence occur almost immediately after the words
in question are delivered is that it makes it difficult for the government to
suppress political speech and ensures that the danger is real, not
speculative. In addition, arguably Evers' statement was a rhetorical
statement, not a specific threat.
However, the imminence requirement also raises a question: why
should the government be unable to regulate hate speech that foments
violence just because the violence does not happen immediately after the
speech is delivered? In Paladin 13,000 copies of the murder manuals had
been published over a period of ten years before John Perry decided to
use them to commit murder, an absence of immediacy which the court
did not find compelling.21 6 Criminal prosecutions since September 11,
2001 also show a change in the government's answer to this question.
The conviction and sentence to life in prison of Muslim scholar Ali alTamimi in July 2005 for encouraging his followers in Virginia to join the
Taliban in Afghanistan in anticipation of the U.S. invasion shows a
weakening of the immediacy prong of the imminence requirement, at
least by one federal district court judge.217 To follow through on alTamini's exhortation would require traveling to Afghanistan and training
to fight for the Taliban, which would take months if not years, which is
certainly not imminent violence under traditional Brandenburg analysis.
Although two of his followers admitted that he inspired them to join the
Taliban, they went to Pakistan and joined a separatist group in Kashmir,
never making it to Afghanistan and never joining the Taliban.218
Perhaps the most direct way to transcend the imminence
requirement is to prohibit threats of unlawful acts.219 In the U.S., this
involves applying the "true threats" doctrine to hate speech.

215. Id. at 932.
216. Rice v. Paladin,128 F. 3d at 241.
217. Scholar Is Given Life Sentence in 'Virginia Jihad' Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2005, at A17.
218. Matthew Barakat, Islamic Scholar Ali Al-Timimi Convicted (April 26, 2005)
http://abcnews.go.com[US/print?id=705180. Note: If this decision stands, opponents will
use it as evidence that flexibility with hate speech restrictions is greater when the
threatened group is the majority population, not a minority group, because they can
identify more easily with the threat and the threat is from without, not within.
219. Another way to transcend the imminence requirement in a constitutional fashion
is to address hate speech that harasses. Harassing speech typically must be persistent,
directed at specific individuals, and inflict significant emotional or physical harm. When
this occurs in a work environment, it causes economic harm which arguably should be
recoverable. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the
Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REv. 687 (1997); Cynthia Grant
Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 517 (1993).
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There are a number of federal statutes that make threatening
statements grounds for criminal prosecution or civil liability.22 ° Some
are specific regarding to whom the threat must be made, such as the
President or Vice-President,22 1 federal judges and other federal
officials, 222 IRS employees, 223 jurors, 224 and providers of abortion
services.2225 Others are more general regarding to whom the threat must
be made. Perhaps the most general federal statute to criminalize threats
makes it a crime to transmit in commerce "any 226
communication
another.,
of
person
the
injure
to
threat
any
containing..,
The Supreme Court's only interpretation of a "threat" statute came
in the 1969 case Watts v. United States. 227 In this case, Watts was
convicted under the aforementioned statute, which prohibited threats
made to the President. 8 At a public rally at the Washington Monument
in Washington, D.C., Watts made the following statement to a small
group of people: "I have received my draft classification as 1-A and I
have got to go for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J.,, 229 The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, distinguishing
threats from political hyperbole and saying this case involved the
latter. 220 The Court concluded that Watts' "only offense was a kind of
very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the
President. '' 221 However, the Court held the statute constitutional "on its
face" and stated that free speech requires "threats" to be limited to threats
that are "true. 222 Not until 2003 did the Supreme
Court provide further
230
threat.,
"true
a
constitutes
what
on
guidance
In the meantime, the circuits adopted various approaches to true
threats, mostly focusing on a subjective or objective analysis of the
speaker's intention and the listener's perception of the threat.2 23 The
speaker must intend to make the threatening statement. 4 The speaker
need not, however, intend to carry the threat out or even have the ability
to carry it out.225 The objective part of the test concerns whether the
220. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2000).
221. Id. at § 871(a).
222. Id. at § 115(a)(1)(b).
223. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2000).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
225. Id. at § 248.
226. Id. at § 875(c).
227. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
228. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706; 18 U.S.C. 871.
229. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706 (quoting an Army investigator's testimony of the
defendant's statements).
230. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (defining true threats as
"statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence").
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speaker should "have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered
would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made. 2 26 Some
circuits consider the reasonable person the listener, as opposed to the
speaker, asking whether a reasonable listener would interpret the speech
as a threat.227 Finally, in keeping with the finding of political hyperbole
in Watts, the court must consider the context of the speech.228
Commentators have wisely proposed that the true threats test consist
of the following two prongs:
1. [A] person speaks or engages in expressive conduct, intending it
to be taken as a threat of unlawful result that would place the listener
in fear of his or her injury... regardless of whether the speaker
intends to carry out the threat; and
2. [A] reasonable listener, in context, would interpret the speech or
expressive conduct as communicating a serious expression of intent
to unlawfully harm the listener. 9
I would modify the first prong slightly by defining intent as
"knowing or reckless" so that intent could be inferred from reckless
threats.2 3 ° Professor Gey argues that the Supreme Court's "incitement to
violence" theory and jurisprudence should govern the "true threats"
theory and jurisprudence. 231 Although both are categorical exceptions to
the First Amendment, they are different, and one should not govern the
other. As the Eighth Circuit wrote, "the Brandenburgtest applies to laws
that forbid inciting someone to use violence against a third party. It does
... that prohibit someone from directly threatening
not apply to statutes
232
another person.,
Because states handle most criminal matters, it comes as no surprise
that state courts are also addressing the true threats test. In 2003, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a conviction under a statute that
provides in relevant part that a person is guilty of a breach of the peace
when that person, "with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof.., threatens to commit any
crime against another person or such other person's property. '233 The
court applied an objective test, whether "a reasonable person would
foresee that the listener will believe he will be subjected to physical
of examining
violence upon his person," along with a contextual analysis
234
listeners."
the
of
reaction
and
"the surrounding events
36
235
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota and Virginia v. Black
show how the U.S. Supreme Court struggles with government attempts
to protect its citizens from hate speech threats. The factual scenario of
the case that gave rise to R.A. V. is the following. Russ and Laura Jones,
who are African-Americans, moved into a working-class white
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neighborhood in St. Paul, Minnesota that was well known among local
African-Americans for its racism. Within a few months of moving there,
the tires on their new station wagon were slashed, the tailgate of their car
was broken, and their son was called a "nigger" on their front sidewalk.
Then, one night a group of skinheads burned three crosses in or near the
Joneses' yard.237 Russ Jones recounted his reaction: "When I saw that
cross burning on our lawn, I thought of the stories my grandparents told
about living in the South and being intimidated by white people. When a
cross was burned down there they either meant to harm you or put you in
your place. 238
The skinheads later admitted they were "really disgusted" by the
presence of an African-American family in their neighborhood and were
trying to drive the Joneses out.239 The City of St. Paul charged one of the
skinheads who had burned the cross on the Joneses' yard with violating
the St. Paul Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance,3 which provides:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to,
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.24 °
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's
"authoritative statement that the ordinance reaches only those
expressions that constitute 'fighting words' within the meaning of
Chaplinksy,'' 241 yet all nine justices held the ordinance unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion joined by Rehnquist,
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, stated that even though fighting words
are excluded from First Amendment protection, the government can still
regulate how they are prohibited and what they prohibit, concluding that
this statute impermissibly discriminates based on content. The statute
was unconstitutional because "[t]he First Amendment does not permit St.
Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views
on disfavored subjects., 232 Justice White, writing a concurrence joined
by Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens, stated the ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad.
Regardless of the Joneses' disagreement with the skinheads' views,
what concerned them most was the threat of more violence. If St. Paul's
statute criminalized true threats, it could have constitutionally punished
the type of symbolic conduct involved in R.A. V. The petitioner, R.A.V.,

231. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379.
232. Id. at 391.
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intended to make the threatening statements, and a reasonable listener
knowing both the context of the events surrounding this incident and the
history of the use of burning crosses, would interpret this expressive
conduct as communicating a serious expression of intent to unlawfully
harm the listener. Justice Scalia hinted at this possibility in the first
footnote of his opinion when he indicated that the conduct in R.A. V.
might violate the Minnesota statute criminalizing terrorist threats.23 3
In addition, if St. Paul or Minnesota adopted a hate crime penalty
enhancement statute, sentencing of R.A.V. could be increased because he
selected the Joneses for this criminal act because of their race. In
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, another unanimous U.S. Supreme Court upheld
Wisconsin's hate crime penalty enhancement statute over a First
Amendment challenge.2 34 Although the statute punished criminal
conduct, it increased the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by
race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry such that it was more severe than the same conduct engaged in
for some other reason or for no reason at all.235 Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote that "motive plays the same role under the Wisconsin statute as it
does under federal and state antidiscrimination [laws], 236 which the
Court has upheld in the face of First Amendment challenges.237
Rehnquist went on to explain the rationale for such statutes: "biasmotivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict
distinct emotional
harms on their victims, and incite community
8
unrest.

23

Eleven years after R.A.V, the Supreme Court heard Virginia v.
Black,239 another cross-burning case that provided the Court with the
opportunity to further define the lines between symbolic speech,
intimidation and free speech under the First Amendment. In Virginia,
the following two cases were consolidated on the constitutional
challenge to the state statute:
On August 22, 1998, Barry Black led 25-30 people in a Ku Klux
Klan rally on private property with the owner's permission and
participation in Cana, Virginia. 240 The rally was in an open field visible
from the state highway where the County Sheriff and others observed the
event. During the rally, participants gave speeches about white
233. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 379. See note 1.
234. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
235. Id. at 480.
236. Id. at 487.
237. See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (Title VII does not infringe
upon employer's First Amendment rights).
238. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 488.
239. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
240. Id. at 348.
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supremacy and how bad blacks and Mexicans are; one speaker stated that
24 1
"he would love to take a .30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the blacks.",
At the end of the rally, the group circled around a large cross, which they
burned while "Amazing Grace" blared over the loudspeakers.24 2 At that
moment, the Sheriff entered the property and arrested Barry Black for
violating Virginia's cross-burning statute, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons, to bum, or cause to be
burned, a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public
place. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a cross shall
be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group
243
of persons.
On May 2, 1998, Richard Elliott and Jonathon O'Mara attempted to
burn a cross on the yard of James Jubilee, an African American and
Elliott's next-door neighbor in Virginia Beach, Virginia.244 Jubiliee had
moved his family from California into his house in Virginia Beach four
months before this incident, and sometime prior to the incident had heard
gunshots coming from Elliott's property. 24 When he inquired at Elliott's
home about the shots, Elliott's mother explained to Jubilee that her son
shot firearms as a hobby and used the backyard as a firing range.246 On
the night of May 2, in order to "get back" at Jubilee for complaining
about the shooting in his backyard, Elliott and O'Mara drove a truck onto
Jubilee's property, planted a cross and set it on fire.247 The next
morning, while Jubilee was pulling his car out of his driveway, he
noticed the partially burned cross. 248 He became "very nervous" because
he "didn't know what would be the next phase," and because "a cross
burned in your yard ... tells you that it's just the first round., 249 Elliott
and O'Mara were charged with attempted cross burning and conspiracy
to commit cross burning and O'Mara plead guilty to both counts while
Elliott went to trial and was convicted of attempted cross burning and
acquitted of conspiracy to commit cross burning.2 5 °
In 2001, the Virginia Supreme Court consolidated these cases and

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 349.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1950).
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 350.
Id.
Id.
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Id. at 350-51.
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declared the statute unconstitutional on its face for two reasons. First,
because of all prohibitive possibilities, the statute "selectively cho[se]
only cross burning because of its distinctive [racist] message," the court
found the statute "analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance
found unconstitutional in R.A. V. 25' The second reason was that to allow
juries to infer intent from the burned cross posed too high a risk that
those who had no such intent would be convicted. 2
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part. Justice O'Connor, with whom the Chief Justice, Stevens, and
Breyer joined, held that: 1) cross burning with no intent to intimidate
was protected by the First Amendment; 2) the state may prohibit cross
burning when such intent is present; and 3) cross burning cannot be
prima facie evidence of such intent.253 Justice Souter, joined by Kennedy
and Ginsburg, argued that any cross burning law constitutes
impermissible content discrimination. 254 Justice Thomas argued that the
entire statute was constitutional because it regulated conduct, not
speech.255 Finally Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in
R.A. V., agreed with the plurality that Virginia's cross burning prohibition
is constitutional if the intent is to intimidate, but not if it is to express a
viewpoint.256 He disagreed with the plurality, however, in his conclusion
that Virginia could make cross burning prima facie evidence of intent to
intimidate.257
A majority of the Court supported the proposition that the
government can proscribe the burning of crosses with intent to intimidate
or threaten. Thus, a true threats statute can list cross burning as a
prohibited form of hate speech as long as it is accompanied with the
intent to threaten or intimidate.
The true threats test could also be applied to other forms of hate
speech that threaten unlawful acts that place a reasonable listener in fear
of physical injury. This lowers the high Brandenburg threshold of
imminent violence to a level where people threatened or intimidated by
hate speech have a legal remedy. This new standard addresses such hate
speech as racial, ethnic and religious epithets, under certain
circumstances, and incitement to ethnic, racial or religious discrimination
or violence, but does not address historical revisionism about racial or
religious groups (i.e. denying the Holocaust).
251.
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Prohibiting hate speech that not only incites to imminent violence,
but also threatens unlawful harm, addresses the most pressing concern
about hate speech:
government protection of its citizens.
The
government's interest in protecting its citizens from violence, the fear of
violence, the disruption that fear engenders, and the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur, outweigh free speech concerns.
Constitutional values and a nation's history may dictate additional
regulation of hate speech, but this is a constitutional minimum.
IV. Conclusion
The divide between the U.S. and the international community on
hate speech regulation can be understood in terms of historical
development and hierarchy of constitutional values. In Europe, events
like the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia have
caused people to elevate human dignity and equality above individual
freedom of expression. In places like South Africa and Rwanda, the
close relationship between hate speech and ethnic and religious strife
leaves people puzzled by the American approach. Perhaps the U.S. focus
on individual liberty rights to free speech reflects not just a deep-seated
distrust of government, but an undervaluing of the effects of slavery and
discrimination against African Americans and the mistreatment of other
minority populations such as the Native Americans. It may also reflect a
belief that the best way to combat such hatred is to allow it to be
expressed and then confront the speaker with other speech.
The common ground in this divide is the interest of government to
protect its citizens from violence, the fear of violence, the disruption that
fear engenders. Because of the close relationship between hate speech
and violence, the governmental interest is paramount when it seeks to
protect its citizens from these harms.
For the U.S. to achieve this governmental interest requires
expanding hate speech regulation beyond the "incitement to imminent
violence" standard to include hate speech that intimidates or threatens
unlawful acts. Applying the "true threats" doctrine to hate speech
accomplishes this task and creates a common ground for dialogue with
the international community.

